Abstract How best to improve climate mitigation measures while we wait for an international consensus on climate policy? This is a practical problem raising important normative issues. The problem is the urgent need for better climate mitigation measures that is time-sensitive: conditions can only deteriorate over time rendering the problem and the relevant stakes even more pressing. The normative issues raised include whether a second-best solution is compelling given these non-ideal conditions and what form such a solution ought to take. This article responds to issues raised in Rolf H. Weber's insightful piece in this special issue, such as the balancing of mitigation policies and securing market competitiveness leading to Weber's defence of border tax adjustment. This article critically examines Weber's position on competitiveness and its connection to border tax adjustment as a second-best option from a justicebased perspective. It is argued that strategies based around taxation-such as the Global Resources Dividend, the polluter pays principle and border tax adjustment-are problematic and unconvincing alternatives.
This article responds to issues raised in Rolf H. Weber's insightful piece in this special issue, such as the balancing of mitigation policies and securing market competitiveness leading to Weber's distinctive defence of border tax adjustment (BTA). This article critically examines Weber's position on competitiveness and its connection to border tax adjustment as a secondbest option from both practical and normative perspectives, taking in account concerns over compliance and non-compliance, scope and effectiveness. It is argued that strategies based around taxation-such as the Global Resources Dividend, the polluter pays principle and border tax adjustment-are problematic and unconvincing alternatives from a justice-based perspective. The article first examines Weber's comments on global public goods before considering the relation of climate change justice to taxation. Border tax adjustments are considered from this standpoint.
Competition-but at what price?
Weber begins by considering the nature of what he calls 'global public goods'. These goods are public insofar as they are non-competitive, non-excludable and open to enjoyment by every individual. Public goods are global where they meet three criteria: first, they benefit more than a single group of countries or regions and so geographicallyextended; secondly, they encompass a broad spectrum of the global population; and, finally, their benefit to present generations need not restrict the ability of future generations to meet their needs.
Global public goods are important because they can affect how we determine international regulations related to these goods, such as clean air and drinking water. For example, consider Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change findings that rising global average sea levels have become an increasing threat to coastal wetlands, agricultural production is more likely to be affected by droughts and tropical diseases are more likely to spread to new geographical areas because of human activities and their effect on the climate (IPCC 2013 (IPCC , 2014 . Climate change threatens several global public goods for present and future generations. This should be taken into account when considering regulations to better safeguard global public goods.
Weber focuses on the impact of legal regulations affecting economic competitiveness internationally. He argues that implementing standards necessarily leads to added costs and so 'measures attempting to limit greenhouse gas emissions have an impact on the international competitiveness of firms' (Weber 2014a) . If a country decides to raise its legal standards to improve environmental outcomes, this runs the risks of making businesses less competitive by raising their costs-costs that businesses located in different countries, but competing in the same marketplace do not possess.
Weber argues that legal regulation should not undermine market competitiveness (Pauwelyn 2007) . We must also guard against the relaxing regulations too much to secure economic advantages because this may lead to a race to the bottom. But to do this we must account for what Weber calls 'non-economic reasons' in determining the appropriate regulations to support (Weber 2014b) .
This perspective appeals to Nicholas Stern's claim that greenhouse gas emissions are an example of 'the greatest market failure the world has ever seen' (Stern 2009: 11) . Stern argues that the prices of some goods, most notably petrol, does not reflect their true costs to society when we consider their production and use. Instead of focusing only on the costs of producing carbon products, we should also account for their consumption and its effects on global public goods. This highlights the crucial difference between costs of production from the costs of consumption: the two are distinct from each other. For example, the costs of production of a car include the raw materials used in a factory and the wages for paying labourers to build the car. The costs of consumption include the harmful effects of the CO2 emissions required to power the factory producing the cars and the fuel to drive them. The difference between the costs of production from the costs of consumption matters because goods such as petrol will sell for much less than its full costs understood in this way-and leaving the unpaid for costs of addressing the use of carbon products and their damaging effects on the environment to the general public.
One concern that can be raised here is that Weber examines the impact of legal regulations affecting economic competitiveness internationally. This is because he offers a legal perspective and this is not a problem per se.
However, it should be noted that legal regulations are one of many available policy options. Others include raising awareness campaigns in the form of a 'nudge' to change public behaviour (Thaler and Sunstein 2009 ). An example is changing the labelling of petrol tanks so that consumers can see not only the amount of gasoline purchased, but also an indication of the estimated carbon emissions this amount is likely to produce and its potential environmental effect. This regulation would not render petrol more expensive on its own, but it might lead consumers to purchase less petrol when made more aware of the impact of their decisions to fill up their cars and trucks.
Likewise, economic competitiveness is one of many relevant factors including its international dimension. This is because the market economy does not operate independently of other social and political factors. Economic competitiveness is desirable, but not at any cost and especially where it could threaten future generations. Furthermore, we should not only consider economic competitiveness-as one among several important factors-between states, but also within states. This is because firms contest markets externally and internally to their home state. Responsible competitiveness takes into account public global goods and it is more than about international regulations between different states, but also regulating market relations within states. This domestic dimension can be easy to overlook. However, the overwhelming majority of firms are small businesses hiring less than 50 employees, and often much less than this. Satisfactory regulations-legal or otherwise-must address the multidimensional factors of the domestic and the international contexts. Otherwise, we may not secure the required effects from regulatory changes.
Finally, regulations need not always increase costs, although taxes usually do. It matters what is counted as the relevant costs against the appropriate timeframe. In the short-term, imposing a new tax would raise costs associated with its implementation, such as its collection. But the significance of such costs disappears against a more long-term timeframe taking into account the potentially higher costs of not implementing a tax aimed at reducing the consumption of oil products. Many choices have costs associated with action or even inaction. The issue is not the costs, but the costs relative to which benefits.
Climate change justice and taxation
Consider the claim cited above by Stern that greenhouse gas emissions are an example of 'the greatest market failure the world has ever seen' (Stern 2009: 11) . This is because the full costs of using oil products, such as petrol, are not accounted for in their purchase. Instead, the purchase of petrol includes the costs of its production, but not its consumption and its damaging effects on global public goods through climate change.
Characterizing the problem in this way highlights a ready solution: ensure the full costs of producing and consuming oil products is reflected in their price. A commonly shared view among normative political theorists is that oil producers should be left to set their own prices subject to taxation by government. One reason is oil producers endure the costs of production and not government. Therefore, government should not dictate the exact costs of producing barrels of oil.
However, oil producers are not as well placed as government to address the consumption of oil products. This is because of the nature of carbon emissions. Governments are more able to administer mitigation policies and attempt to coordinate them with other states through international regulatory agreements. This is all the more important because taxation might have certain costs for companies today, but the costs of inaction are spread out globally and internationally raising costs for us all tomorrow. Someone must pick up the bill and so it is widely argued by normative political theorists that some form of tax should be imposed on the purchase of oil products.
This perspective is often labelled the so-called polluter pays principle. It can be premised on the idea that consumers possess a negative duty to provide some form of compensation to others for the harm they cause through their carbon emissions-and this article will focus on work by leading theorists on the polluter pays principle as a negative duty (Caney 2005; Gaines 1991; Neumayer 2000) . This principle can be further premised on the idea that it can be possible to compensate for environmental damage. This is highly contestable in light of the fact that global public goods may not be compensatory goods and we cannot assume all environmental impacts have a discernible monetary cost. If we cannot assign a monetary cost, then this renders much more difficult monetary policies such as a BTA. It is also unclear why we should in principle permit compensation from others to address our being subjected to their environmental damage.
Nonetheless, supporters of the polluter pays principle are among the most prominent in the political thought literature. Perhaps the leading figure in the area of global justice, Thomas Pogge, provides support for this principle through his endorsing a Global Resources Dividend (GRD) (Pogge 2008:202-21) . Pogge argues that the consumption of oil products and the production of carbon emissions in affluent states presents more significant threats to states with large populations in severe poverty. Affluent states receive benefits of improving economies at the expense of less affluent states left to bear more of the costs, and more exposed to the threats that climate change creates.
Pogge argues that the citizens of affluent states have a negative duty to provide some effective means of compensating persons in less affluent states. This is because 'we' in affluent states knowingly, foreseeable and avoidably engage in practices that lead to 'our' benefiting at the expense of others who are harmed by their bearing more of the harms and risks of climate change among other problems (Brooks 2007 ). Pogge claims there should be a GRDessentially, a tax of perhaps $2 per barrel of oil that is collected by government and used to provide compensation to less affluent states by helping provide mitigation and adaptation so they are protected from the potential harms of climate change. Pogge argues the amounts generated through a GRD will more than compensate less affluent states and also contribute to less carbon emissions by raising the cost of petrol (2008: 202-21) .
This latter claim is an article of faith for many supporters of the polluter pays principle. The argument is that polluters should pay added costs because their position poses harms to others which must be compensated for. Moreover, these added costs have the added benefit of creating disincentives for individuals to become polluters. For example, because polluting is more expensive. Polluter pays principle supporters believe that not only can a tax provide adequate compensation to others for environmental damage they expose others to, but that carbon emissions will drop to sustainable levels worldwide when consuming oil products is made more expensive through added taxation. For defenders of the polluter pays principle, we can tax our way to climate change justice and a sustainable future.
But this view rests on problematic assumptions. One concern is that while higher petrol costs are associated with less emissions, there is no evidence to suggest that these emissions would drop sufficiently low to yield the kind of sustainable, conservationist future the polluter pays principle promises for only a few dollars extra per barrel as these normative political theorists endorse (US Energy Information Administration 2011: 6-7). The kind of outcomes they support may require more significant taxes than they claim.
A second concern relates to what a polluter pays principle might allow. The polluter pays principle is a means to generating income to support mitigation or adaptation strategies while reducing carbon emissions to sustainable levels. The problem is that polluters can pollute as much as they can pay (Brooks 2012) . The costs may increase, but polluters can continue to produce harmful carbon emissions if they have the means to pay the added tax (US EIA 2011).
Some polluter pays principle advocates are aware of these objections. It can be argued that we are all under a duty not to exceed a quota for carbon emissions (see Caney 2005) . There should be a global emissions cap restricting how much emissions can be produced worldwide. Polluters should still pay for producing carbon emissions, but only within this cap. The idea is that the cap should be set so low as to secure a sustainable future while revenue generated from the tax on emissions can support mitigation and adaptation efforts. In this way, a polluter pays principle might be supported within a cap on global emissions.
The problem with this approach is the normative force of the polluters' negative duties is removed. If polluters should pay, but only within a global emissions cap that secures a sustainable future then there are no negative duties arising from their activity because there is no harm produced. What does the work here is not the principle, but the global emissions cap-and the share of emissions available to individuals and governments for their use is left out.
Border tax adjustment and justice?
Weber examines a different, but not entirely unrelated taxation regime, specifically BTA, to secure greater climate change justice. This is a means to compensate lax environmental standards in international trade. He argues it can be realised through two different models. The first is through the levy of a tax on products from states with 'lower production standards' or the refund of domestic taxes where these products are exported. The second is 'the requirement to obtain emission allowances and to participate in an Emission Trading System (ETS)' (Kaufmann and Weber 2011; Weber 2014a) .
BTA measures are set by national governments and can be assessed by the World Trade Organization. Weber argues that BTA measures should be designed 'as indirect product taxes within the scope of Article II GATT' where these 'taxes aim at creating a level playing field between Blike products^in the country of destination' (Weber this issue). He adds: 'If the carbon tax cannot be linked to the goods directly, but only to the production of the goods, it is important to design the tax in a way that it has an internal or incorporated nature, similar to charges on fuels or energy inputs on fossil fuels used in the production process' (Weber 2014a ).
Weber proceeds to provide an insightful and illuminating legal perspective of the relevant issues and challenges-much of which I agree with. We should draw our attention to further implications of his legal analysis. This is our focus in this section.
The first issue we should raise relates to Weber's comment that 'the measure must be applied so as not to create an arbitrary or unjustified discrimination or as not to lead to disguised restrictions on international trade as required by the Chapeau of Article XX GATT' (Lay 2012; Weber 2014b) . This is likely to be subjected to disagreement. The problem is that the idea of BTA is presented as an acceptable second-best option in light of the lack of any 'thick' global consensus. But the lack of such a global consensus does not go away when we consider trade restrictions, such as the BTA. If the goal is to provide a second-best option less subject to the problems of a lacking international consensus, then these conditions do not appear to obtain. While there is general agreement on procedures for settling relevant conflicts within the WTO, conflicts remain although it is not claimed that any remaining disagreement is on the same level as disagreement about global climate policy.
A second issue is non-compliance. If BTA is to work, it must be implemented by national governments and avoid running afoul of WTO regulations. But what if other governments did not cooperate with the ETS? What body would be empowered sufficiently to address issues of non-compliance and would it be effective? Of course, some cases of a lack of consensus may be comparatively more tractable than others: disagreements about arbitrary discrimination under trade law might be easier to resolve than disagreements concerning climate policy. Nonetheless, the answers to these questions are unclear.
It might be argued in response that preventing non-compliance is not a problem. For example, suppose the UK adopt a BTA that another country, such as China, does not want to pay to export its goods to the UK. The UK could simply refuse to import these Chinese goods and so non-compliance appears to be handled easily. But this is less true in other cases. Take the EU aviation tax. Some Chinese and Indian companies refused to comply. Their collective political clout appeared sufficiently strong to get the EU to backpedal (Hale and Carrington 2012) . So non-compliance can be a problem in some cases.
This problem relates to the particulars concerning BTA implementation. To understand the issues pertaining to non-compliance, we need to know more about what is required by satisfying compliance. We must consider how onerous might BTA agreements be, what forms they can take and how much revenue is expected to be generated. These questions aim to highlight the possible options available to help negotiate new future terms for compliance and signal alternatives for how BTA can take shape. Much depends on what is included and revenue generated.
A third issue is scope. The plan focuses on international agreements between states. But is this the only perspective? BTA are agreements designed and implemented by national governments in relation to trade across state boundaries aiming to address the problem of carbon leakage across borders. However, trading patterns can be more complex than this. For example, the tax base for what the tax is levied on can be an issue. While most existing BTA proposals aim at the production site, these can also be multi-national, too. Furthermore, a customer in the United Kingdom could buy services advertised on a website hosted in the United States, but where any cash transactions are made in the Republic of Ireland or Luxembourg and transported using a Dutch delivery service.
While this is a hypothetical illustration, an activity that might look like nothing more than a private individual purchasing a product online and having it delivered to her door can, in fact, involve multiple points at which different states are involved. Some points relate to web design and hosting, others the registered office and still others the distribution arm. Different countries may be the site for one point-like a company's registered address-but others the site for different points. How might BTA legislated by individual countries capture the complex web of market relations governing an increasing larger part of the globalised economy we find ourselves in? This is far from clear and it raises further questions about our ability to deliver better environmental regulation and a level playing field through a fair and transparent tax base in an interconnected world.
One possible response is to claim BTA might be imperfect, but it is better than our doing nothing. It might be argued that some agreement is preferable to none. This is because the use of the BTA could help win wider support over time leading to a more stringent international agreement (Roser and Tomlinson 2014: 229) . The BTA might be understood as a means to an important end of delivering a climate policy more fit for purpose. So perhaps the scope is limited, but the BTA makes possible a wider inclusion of countries in future. This is guesswork. However, it is reasonable to believe that if BTA can be made workable at the national and regional level then it might achieve greater agreement. International agreements carrying universal support are very difficult to achieve from the start and normally require a slower build-up of support and momentum over time. The problem of scope is a concern, but need not be a deal-breaker if we accept BTA as a means to a better end. But there remains the possibility that a dedicated focus on BTA to the exclusion of a more inclusive international deal could incentivise states to pursue unilateral agreements instead of multilateral, comprehensive agreements for collective action on climate policy (Roser and Tomlinson 2014: 242) .
A final issue is effectiveness. What likely effect can we expect from BTA? If we accepted its use and resolved issues concerning compliance and non-compliance, what should it look like in practice to deliver the practical benefits it aspires to achieve? This is highly relevant to our agreeing to BTA as a second-best solution or, indeed, a solution worth pursuing at all. It is unclear why we should ultimately support BTA, assuming its potential legality, given the many known unknowns (to use a phrase by Donald Rumsfeld) concerning its use. So perhaps implementing BTA is possible, but this is not to establish it is preferable in relation to other options. This is especially true in light of a lack of international coordination on what the terms of BTA should be in order to (second-)best mitigate climate change effects.
One response might be to reject BTA in favour of some other form of tax on carbon emissions that applies universally, if it is feasible (Eckersley 2010) . Such a tax would create a more level playing field by its including a similar standard for all. This could be a means of raising funds that could finance a transition to a low-carbon economy. It would become more profitable for firms to reduce their carbon footprint in their production and sale of goods and services.
It might be objected that this concern is irrelevant as BTA is supported because a universal carbon tax is infeasible. However, while this approach might address concerns about scope, it is not obvious that it would be more effective than alternatives such as BTA-and so not a clearly preferable alternative if a universal carbon tax was feasible. For example, the fact that costs might rise when producing certain goods for all will not impact everyone the same. Those who can afford goods and services made more expensive may still do so. The problem is akin to my criticism of the polluter pays principle that it might permit polluters to pollute as much as they can pay. Treating all states the same might sound like sharing responsibilities for tackling climate change equally. But higher taxes may not yield desired outcomes on their own. Furthermore, not all states possess the same historic responsibilities for the problems we face due to climate change. So treating all states the same denies the greater responsibilities some have for the problems faced (Brandi 2013) . Moreover, the use of a tax like BTA does not necessarily shift the burden of responsibility from emissions producers to consumers because consumers might pass the extra costs on to producers (Roser and Tomlinson 2014: 236-37).
5 Conclusion: is the road to sustainability paved by taxes?
Climate change is an urgent global problem and it lacks an international consensus about how it should be tackled. This article critically examined Weber's argument for BTA as a secondbest option in light of this lack of consensus. It has been argued that the use of BTA does not avoid the problems it seeks to overcome. Instead, it raises new concerns that should make us question not so much its potential legality-which Weber helps establish-but its attractiveness. Perhaps some form of taxes are required on products linked with carbon emissions. But is the best or second-best road to a sustainable future paved by changing the tax code? This case is well-argued, but still unconvincing. There may be greater mileage in pursuing awareness raising campaigns using nudges to change public behaviour, such as through new labelling that indicates estimated carbon emissions likely to be produced their potential environmental effect. Regulations like these may be a way of positively changing individual behaviour without imposing taxes-and avoid problems related to their use.
